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RECENT DECISIONS
to allow them to challenge a prior divorce of a surviving spouse.
In re Pusey's Estate, 180 Cal. 368, 181 P. 648 (1919). See Nimmer's Estate v. Nimmer, 212 S. C. 311, 47 S. E. 2d 716 (1948),
where on similar facts collateral attack by heirs was allowed.
Decisions which seem to deny this interest in heirs are distinguishable because of the appearance of the other party in the
divorce proceedings, thereby estopping any collateral denial of
jurisdiction. Johnson v. Muelberge.r, 340 U. S. 581 (1951); Shea
v. Shea, 270 App. Div. 527, 60 N. Y. S. 2d 823 (2d Dep't 1946).
The instant case represents the great reluctance by courts to
allow collateral attack on seemingly valid marriages, but this
writer suggests the majority reasoning here is too restrained, especially in view of decisions in other jurisdictions and the policy
underlying the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act. This policy is
to refuse recognition of foreign divorce decrees acquired by domicilaries, subject only to constitutional limitations. The Williams
case suggests that there would be no constitutional obstacle to
declaration of the invalidity of the instant divorce decree.
Paul A. Foley

EVIDENCE - CROSS-EXAMINATION TO EIPEACH
CREDIBILITY HELD PREJUDICIAL
In an action to recover for personal injuries received while
boarding a bus, plaintiff was cross-examined as to prior convictions for intoxication. Held (4-1): Since intoxication is not a
crime, such questioning was not competent to impeach credibility
and should have been excluded. McQuage v. City of New York,
285 App. Div. 249, 136 N. Y. S. 2d 111 (1st Dep't 1954).
For purposes of attacking credibility, a witness may be crossexamined concerning any immoral, vicious, or criminal act of his
life which may affect his character and tend to show him to be
unworthy of belief. RIcHARDso, EvIDENCE (7th ed. 1948) § 576;
People v. Sorge, 301 N. Y. 198, 93 N. E. 2d 637 (1950). Jurisdictions differ as to what types of moral misconduct are relevant to
veracity and thus a proper subject of cross-examination. The
English rule has been to allow anything to be asked. Diametrically opposed are two or three states which forbit any inquiries into
the moral past of the witness. However, most states, including
New York, follow a middle course. According to this theory, the
range of the questioning is left to the control of the trial judge.
WIGMORE, EvnDENcE

§ 146 (Students' Ed. 1935). In Freidelv. Board
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of Regents, 296 N. Y. 347, 73 N. E. 2d 545 (1947), (review of administrative agency ruling), the New York Court of Appeals
held that the extent of cross-examination of an adverse witness
to impeach credibility rests in the discretion of the tribunal, whose
exercise thereof is not reviewable unless abused.
Generally the cases holding that the extent of cross-examination to impeach a witness' credibility rests within the discretion
of the trial judge deal with situations in which the judge refused
to permit disparaging questions. Questions attacking the character of the witness were held properly excluded in Third Great
Western Turnpike Road Co. v. Loomis, 32 N. Y. 127 (1865) and in
LaBeau v. People, 34 N. Y. 223 (1866) (questions concerning
female witness' illicit relations with various men). Where the
basis for appeal has been that the trial judge allowed too much in
the way of attack on character, courts in the past warned against
overstepping the limits, but nevertheless permitted the testimony
to be introduced. People v. Bloodgood, 251 App. Div. 593, 601,
298 N. Y. Supp. 91, 100 (3d Dep't 1937) (prosecutor's claim that
defendant associated with "crooks" improper, but not grounds
for reversal). These cases indicated that discretion must be
plainly abused to form a basis for reversal.
More recent cases have specifically held that there are limits
to a trial judge's area of discretion and that his exceeding those
limits by permitting questions that tend to prejudice the jury is
a basis for reversal. People v. Malkin, 250 N. Y. 185, 164 N. E.
900 (1928) (questions concerning witness' expulsion from a labor
union held prejudicial). Cross-examining a policeman about his
poor department record was held to be prejudicial in People v.
Bilanchuk, 280 App. Div. 180, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 414 (1st Dep't 1952).
In that case the court held that a defendant who takes the witness
stand may be cross-examined concerning any previous vicious,
illegal or immoral acts, but questions which do not fairly tend to
impeach his credibility as a witness may not be allowed. It is
significant that it was the appellate court's opinion as to what
"queries fairly tend to impeach credibility," not that of the trial
court, that was decisive.
A recent federal court decision has carried this idea even
further by holding that specific acts of misconduct not resulting in
conviction of a crime of moral turpitude are not the proper subject of cross-examination for impeachment purposes. U. S. v.
Provoo, 215 F. 2d 531 (2d Cir. 1954) (defendant cross-examined
as to homosexuality). Likewise, in an action based on alleged
carelessness in the operation of a bus, it was held error to permit
cross-examination of defendant's driver as to prior accidents,
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whether or not for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the
witness, since the effect was to prejudice the minds of the jurors.
Grenadier v. Surface Transportation Corp. of New York, 271
App. Div. 460, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 130 (1st Dep't 1946).
To impeach a witness' credibility, much is allowed. However,
the above cases indicate a trend towards limiting the extent of
cross-examination for impeachment. This restriction is two-fold.
First, certain areas have been banned, e. g. previous negligent acts,
whether or not affecting credibility. Grenadierv. Surface Trans.
Corp. of N. Y., supra. Second, from a position of leaving complete
control in the hands of the trial judge, the courts in People v. Bilanchuk, supra, and the instant case, have taken it upon themselves
to decide whether the cross-examination was a legitimate attack
on credibility.
It is the writer's opinion that where an appellate court limits
a trial judge's discretionary area in allowing cross-examination
for impeachment purposes by forbidding certain subjects, it is
acting within its proper sphere. However, where the appellate
court, as in the instant case, substitutes its opinion for that of
the trial judge as to whether or not the cross-examination was
for the purpose of attacking credibility, it is not acting properly
and is seriously interfering with the right of cross-examination.
Alan H. Levine
FEDERAL PROCEDURE - APPEALABILITY OF DENIAL
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56 (a) (c) (e) on his complaint praying for both
a temporary and permanent injunction to prevent defendants
from copying plaintiff's trade name and corporate title was
denied by the District Court. Held: The order denying the
motion was appealable under 28 IU. S. C. A. 1291, 1292(1). Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 217 F. 2d 936 (2d Cir. 1954).
Finality has been the historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure ever since it was written into the first Judiciary
Act. (Now 28 U. S. C. A. 1291). Cobbledick v. United States,
309 U. S. 323 (1940). The basis for this policy is not only to
protect judicial administration from piecemeal litigation but also
to eliminate delays and avoid obstruction of just claims which
would otherwise be jeopardized by harassment and the cost of
the various successive appeals before final judgment. Catlin v.
United States, 324 U. S. 229 (1945).

